Key Takeaways
- Why MFA gets bypassed structurally: MFA protects only the moment an authentication token is created (session cookies, refresh tokens, and OAuth tokens each require separate protection thereafter), and SMS/email-based MFA—vulnerable to phishing, reverse proxies (AitM attacks like Evilginx2), MFA fatigue, and SIM swapping—is still widely deployed. In addition, some solutions labeled ‘MFA’ are in practice only passwordless logins, which worsens both user fatigue and the phishing surface (the original post cites Microsoft Authenticator as an example).
- Practical decision criteria: Rather than picking a single priority, organizations should separately measure the maturity of three axes as distinct KPIs—(1) phishing-resistant authentication adoption (FIDO2/passkeys, device-bound, unmanaged fallback options (SMS/voice) disabled), (2) post-authentication session protection (bound sessions, shortened token lifetimes, token-theft response), and (3) post-auth detection and response (UEBA, risk scoring based on behavioral anomalies, ITDR)—and reinforce the weakest axis first. The community consensus is that ‘a good window and a good door’ are both required; strengthening only one side makes the other the largest attack surface.
- Anti-patterns to avoid: ① Treating SMS/email-only MFA as ‘good enough’ and not advancing to the next stage. ② Cutting post-authentication visibility and detection investment to near zero once MFA rollout is declared ‘complete.’ ③ Defaulting to simple push approval on every login without number matching, which invites MFA fatigue. ④ Logging abnormal sign-in notifications without review or action. ⑤ Splitting identity/authentication and SOC detection into separate teams and tools so that event context is fragmented. Because social engineering can bypass any technical control, the ‘people’ axis—training and procedures—must receive budget on par with the technology stack.
MFA is only a first gate that guards the single moment an authentication token is created, so treating ‘stronger authentication’ and ‘post-authentication visibility and detection’ as a binary choice rather than as two axes of the same defense-in-depth posture is a mistake. Identifying the weakest axis in the organization and reinforcing it first is the core lever for materially reducing the attack surface.
Table of Contents
- Key Takeaways
- Where MFA Stops and Where It Starts to Leak
- Community Consensus: ‘A Good Window and a Good Door’ Are Both Required
- Diagnostic Framework: 3-Axis Self-Assessment
- Axis 1: Strengthening Phishing-Resistant Authentication — FIDO2/Passkeys
- Axis 2: Post-Authentication Visibility — ITDR + SIEM/SOAR

Even after MFA is rolled out, incidents involving session hijacking, credential leakage, and post-authentication anomalous activity continue to be reported on a regular basis. From an engineering standpoint, this is no longer a problem confined to ‘organizations without MFA.’ Whether the stack is Microsoft Entra, Okta, or Google Workspace, the MFA checkbox is enabled and yet incident reports keep piling up, while security operations teams face pressure every quarter to write the same kind of post-mortem.
In the original thread (r/cybersecurity – Are we putting too much faith in MFA?), operators raise a common dilemma: ‘Should we make authentication itself stronger with FIDO2/passkeys, or invest in precise detection and response of post-authentication behavior?’ The question of which one to do first rarely yields a useful answer in practice. These two are not competing choices but two axes of the same defense.
Where MFA Stops and Where It Starts to Leak
MFA protects only the single moment an authentication token is created. It can block a user up to the point where they pass the password and OTP and a SAML/OIDC token is issued, but the session cookie, refresh token, and OAuth access token that come after require separate controls. The attack vectors that exploit this blind spot are already standardized.
A representative example is the AitM (Adversary-in-the-Middle) reverse proxy attacks represented by Evilginx2. The attacker routes the login page through a reverse proxy that looks like the legitimate domain to the user, intercepting the entered credentials and session cookie. At the moment MFA succeeds and the token is issued, that token is already in the attacker’s hands. SMS OTP, TOTP, and simple push authentication do not provide the same level of phishing resistance against this vector. SMS/email-based MFA is therefore classified as the area where MFA’s limits are most pronounced.
MFA fatigue attacks reach the same conclusion. An attacker bombards a single user with dozens of push notifications, making it impossible to distinguish legitimate from malicious alerts, and ultimately secures a single accidental approval. Even when the authentication channel is multi-factor, it is bypassed by social engineering. With Microsoft Authenticator enforcing number matching, simple push fatigue is largely neutralized; however, legacy push mechanisms and persistent prompt spamming remain threats.
Community Consensus: ‘A Good Window and a Good Door’ Are Both Required
The consensus that recurs in r/cybersecurity and r/netsec is clear: ‘You need both a good window and a good door.’ Stronger authentication and post-auth detection are not a priority contest; they are two axes whose maturity must be measured simultaneously. Strengthening only one makes the other the largest attack surface.
Even in an organization that has rolled out passkeys at 100%, if session tokens remain valid for eight hours and no UEBA is in place to detect AitM attacks that intercept them, users are exposed to a new pattern: ‘not phished, but their session is stolen.’ Conversely, even with hundreds of detection rules in SIEM/SOAR, if user authentication still relies on SMS OTP, attackers keep breaking through with the same phishing template. The real decision criterion is not ‘what is more important’ but ‘which axis is weaker.’ Measuring the maturity of all three axes as separate KPIs and reinforcing the lowest-scoring axis first is the only path that materially reduces the attack surface.
Diagnostic Framework: 3-Axis Self-Assessment
The maturity of the phishing-resistant authentication axis can be classified into stages 0 through 3. Stage 0 uses only SMS/email OTP. Stage 1 introduces TOTP or push authentication. Stage 2 applies FIDO2/passkeys only to high-risk accounts and administrators. Stage 3 applies FIDO2/passkeys device-bound to all users, with unmanaged fallback options (SMS/voice) disabled.
The session and privilege control axis is measured by access token lifetime, refresh token rotation, application of CAE (Continuous Access Evaluation), and adoption of PIM/JIT privilege models. The post-authentication detection axis is evaluated by ITDR tool presence, UEBA-based risk scoring, SIEM/SOAR integration, and the review/action SLA for post-event alerts. If any of the three axes is below stage 1, reinforcing that axis first yields the highest incident-prevention ROI. Budget should be spread to lift all three axes in balance only when most are already at stages 2–3.
Axis 1: Strengthening Phishing-Resistant Authentication — FIDO2/Passkeys
The first practical task is to visualize enrollment rates. In Microsoft Entra ID, the following PowerShell command retrieves passkey registration status immediately.
Get-MgReportAuthenticationMethodUserRegistrationDetail `
-Filter "methodsRegistered/any(m:m eq 'passKey')" `
| Select-Object UserPrincipalName, IsMfaRegistered, IsPasswordlessCapable, MethodsRegistered
If enrollment rates are low, the Authentication Strengths policy in Conditional Access should be incrementally raised to require ‘Phishing-resistant MFA.’ Okta’s Phishing-Resistant Authentication policy can be forced to allow only device-bound WebAuthn, and Google Workspace achieves the same effect via the Advanced Protection Program and Security Key Enforcement. Per-login simple push (one-time approval without number matching) should be phased out.
The standard timeline to retire SMS/email MFA is 90 days. Days 1–30 are for inventory and exception-account classification. Days 31–60 are for enforcing FIDO2 on administrators and high-risk groups. Days 61–90 are for organization-wide rollout to all users, with SMS demoted to a ‘break-glass account.’ Reverting to simple push approval as the default to spare user friction is the most common regression in this process.
Axis 2: Post-Authentication Visibility — ITDR + SIEM/SOAR
To route post-authentication events into a SIEM, both IdP logs and identity-related events are required. Microsoft Defender for Identity, CrowdStrike Falcon Identity Protection, Push Security, Obsidian Security, and BeyondTrust fall under the ITDR category, and they route events into SIEMs such as Sentinel, Splunk, or Elastic, and into SOARs such as Tines or Cortex XSOAR.
The first five detection rules to implement are: ① Token reuse from anomalous times, geographies, or ASNs. ② Impossible Travel (long-distance location jumps within a short window). ③ MFA fatigue/spray patterns (many push requests to a single user in a short window, or simultaneous pushes to many users). ④ Automatic creation of mailbox rules (an attacker persistence indicator). ⑤ OAuth privilege escalation and consent grant events (especially broad scopes such as Mail.Read and Files.ReadWrite).
A Sentinel KQL example based on Microsoft Entra ID sign-in logs is as follows.
SigninLogs
| where ResultType == 0 // successful sign-in
| where AppDisplayName in ("Office 365 Exchange Online", "Microsoft Graph")
| summarize SignInCount = count(),
DistinctCountries = dcount(LocationDetails.countryOrRegion),
DistinctCities = dcount(LocationDetails.city)
by UserPrincipalName, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where DistinctCountries > 1 or DistinctCities > 2
| order by TimeGenerated desc
The query above detects successful sign-ins from multiple countries or cities within a one-hour window. A separate Impossible Travel rule is maintained for the same user, calculating risk from the time delta and geographic distance between two events. Alerts must be bound to a review-and-action SLA. High/critical sign-ins should be confirmed and blocked by the SOC within 30 minutes via an on-call rotation. The key is to avoid building alert channels that only log without anyone watching them.
Axis 3: Session and Privilege Control — CAE + PIM/JIT
The goal of the third axis is to minimize the usable lifetime of a stolen token. Enabling Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE) in Microsoft Entra ID immediately invalidates a token when user state changes occur (account disabled, password changed, device compliance lost). Access token lifetime should be shortened to 15–60 minutes, and refresh token rotation should be enforced.
Conditional Access policy example (Microsoft Graph API call format):
{
"displayName": "Require Phishing-Resistant + Compliant Device",
"state": "enabledForReportingButNotEnforced",
"conditions": {
"users": { "includeGroups": ["<all-staff-group-id>"] },
"applications": { "includeApplications": ["All"] },
"signInRiskLevels": ["medium", "high"],
"clientAppTypes": ["browser", "mobileAppsAndDesktopClients"]
},
"grantControls": {
"operator": "OR",
"builtInControls": [
"compliantDevice",
"domainJoinedDevice"
],
"authenticationStrength@odata.bind": "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/identity/conditionalAccess/authenticationStrength/policies('00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000002')"
},
"sessionControls": {
"signInFrequency": { "value": 1, "type": "hours" },
"persistentBrowser": { "mode": "never" },
"continuousAccessEvaluation": { "mode": "strictEnforcement" }
}
}
Administrative privileges should be transitioned from a standing-permission model to a JIT (Just-In-Time) elevation model under PIM (Privileged Identity Management). Time limits (for example, 1–4 hours), approval workflows, and activity logs should be enforced at role activation, narrowing the window for privilege abuse and lateral movement.
Five Anti-Patterns to Avoid
First, treating SMS/email-only MFA as ‘good enough’ and not advancing to the next stage. It is often justified on cost and accessibility grounds, but the fundamental lack of phishing resistance that defines MFA’s limits does not change. Second, letting post-authentication visibility and detection investment shrink to near zero once MFA rollout is declared ‘complete.’ Cutting SOC headcount and tooling budgets because authentication is ‘solved’ is the pattern most frequently observed just before an incident.
Third, defaulting to per-login simple push approval in the name of user convenience. Push notifications that operate without number matching are directly exposed to MFA fatigue attacks. Fourth, logging abnormal sign-in notifications without review or action. Alerts are meaningful only when operated on the assumption that ‘a human sees them and decides.’ Fifth, splitting identity/authentication and SOC detection into separate teams and tools so that event context is fragmented. Having the identity team and the SOC team each analyze the same incident from different vantage points multiplies MTTR by 2–3×.
Because social engineering can bypass any technical control, the ‘people’ axis—training and procedures—must receive budget on par with the technology stack. Phishing simulations should be run not as a simple awareness program but as a feedback loop into system improvement (see also 7-Step Practical Procedure for Repeat Phishing Simulation Failures).
90-Day Execution Roadmap
Days 0–30 (Diagnose): Compute the 3-axis self-assessment score, map the user distribution by enrolled authentication method, and inventory token lifetime and session policies. The output is consolidated into a single dashboard.
Days 31–60 (Pilot): Enforce FIDO2/passkeys on high-risk groups (administrators, finance, security), deploy the first ITDR rule set, and operate the token-lifetime shortening policy in report-only mode. Measure false-positive rates on detection alerts and tune the rules accordingly.
Days 61–90 (Enforce): Switch enterprise-wide policies to enforce mode, enable CAE, apply PIM JIT organization-wide, and bring the alert on-call rotation online. Track KPIs including passkey enrollment rate, percentage of high-risk sign-ins blocked within 30 minutes, average JIT activation time, and alert-review SLA compliance rate.
What to Do Right Now
- In the IdP console, immediately query the share of users still on SMS/email-only MFA and plot a distribution chart.
- Select 20 high-risk-group users (Global Admin, Exchange Admin, security team) and prioritize FIDO2 passkey enrollment for them, reporting progress weekly until registration is complete.
- Deploy at least one ‘successful sign-ins across multiple countries/cities within a short window’ rule in the SIEM and compute the false-positive rate against the last 7 days of historical logs.
- Turn on a Conditional Access session policy that shortens sign-in frequency (re-authentication interval) in report-only mode (token lifetimes are governed separately via Token Lifetime Policies) and measure the number of affected users.
- Switch administrative role activation requests to PIM/JIT and enforce a 4-hour maximum privilege duration.
Frequently Asked Questions
How is legacy system compatibility handled when adopting FIDO2/passkeys?
Legacy apps that do not support WebAuthn are realistically classified as a separate ‘exception group’ and excluded from the authentication strength requirement in Conditional Access. However, that group should have ITDR detection strength doubled and sign-in frequency shortened to 30–60 minutes as compensating controls. Exceptions are not a permanent state; they are reviewed quarterly and reduced.
If detection alerts overwhelm the SOC, how should priorities be assigned?
First, automatically block (or forcibly terminate sessions for) only the combination of ‘successful authentication + anomalous location/time’ as a tier-1 automated action, and route the remaining alerts to a daily batch review. Alert severity itself must be redesigned around user impact to reduce alert fatigue. The direction is to tune toward fewer, more meaningful alerts rather than more alerts.
How is the cost justification for the 3-axis reinforcement explained to executives?
Calculate the average cost of a single breach (investigation, recovery, regulatory response, brand damage) for the organization’s industry, then present scenarios showing how much incident frequency and MTTR each decrease when all three axes move from stage 1 to stage 2. Technology budgets are most persuasive when justified as a ratio against the cost of avoided incidents.
Source
This article was prepared with reference to the following original thread: r/cybersecurity — Are we putting too much faith in MFA?









