The OpenSSH authentication bypass flaw SSHole (CVE-2026-123158) was reportedly used in real attacks less than nine hours after its disclosure. Threat intelligence company Preividian observed a case in which an attacker gained root access on a decoy server running Alpine Linux. It has not confirmed whether the same access was possible on actual production equipment.
Real SSHole attacks captured shortly after disclosure
Previdian observed eight attack attempts against the decoy server. Based on the source IP location, the attempts originated in Japan. An attacker connected from the listed source IP, 89.116.89[.]18, through a noninteractive SSH session and ran the id, uname, and hostname commands to inspect system information. The attacker logged in to an account that disallowed password authentication without stealing a password or key.
Cowrie honeypot data showed an increase in long password requests beginning on November 1. The first real exploit attempt, using a password composed entirely of the letter “A,” was confirmed on November 5. Some of the initial long passwords were found to be unrelated to ordinary brute-force activity. SSHole honeypot observation data showed the same pattern.
How the SSHole flaw works and which systems are affected
The flaw originated in a patch for a 2016 username disclosure issue, CVE-2016-6210. Under certain conditions, a failed password hash calculation is stored as an asterisk (*). Because this is the same value used for accounts that disallow password authentication, the OpenSSH server may allow the account to log in. Ozgun Kultekin discovered that entering a password between 257 and 1,024 bytes causes the issue.
Exploitation requires a Linux system based on the musl C library, a configuration that does not use PAM, and at least one account whose password hash is stored as an asterisk. The password for an account with a valid hash cannot be bypassed this way. Dropbear, glibc-based Linux distributions, systems other than Linux, and systems that check passwords with PAM are outside the scope of impact.
After a successful bypass, the available permissions depend on the access originally granted to the compromised account. Attackers may also be able to access deployment credentials, application secrets, and connected infrastructure, so administrators should review account privileges and stored authentication information together.
Checking logs, patching, and restarting the service
Alpine advised administrators to search /var/log/messages for “Accepted password for” entries and determine whether accounts that should not accept passwords, such as alpine, root, or key-only users, had any abnormal successful logins. On systems exposed to the internet, administrators should also review doas usage, recently created users and files, and authorized_keys entries.
Administrators should install OpenSSH 10.6p2 or the patch package for the distribution they use, and then restart the SSH server program. Alpine said that if login access cannot be ruled out, the system should be considered compromised.
Source
This article was prepared by reviewing the following source: 보안뉴스 (Boannews) — Attempts on eight fronts reach root on decoy server, SSHole in OpenSSH exploited within nine hours of disclosure
Cross-checked sources:

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