OT Remote Access: From Asset Mapping to Verification

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미 연방기관 32% ‘기초 자산 목록’조차 없어... 한계 부딪힌 글로벌 OT 보안

As cases emerge of U.S. federal civilian agencies failing to properly inventory their operational technology (OT) assets, infrastructure security is shifting toward remote access control. Of the 22 agencies examined by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), seven failed to establish an initial OT asset inventory, while the other 15 failed to meet management standards because of inadequate maintenance and missing requirements. Across the full group, 68.2% lacked even minimal visibility into security controls for remotely connected devices, elevating risks surrounding remote access to a national security concern.

These management gaps created more direct risks for water infrastructure. In late July, more than 30 water facilities across Minnesota were hit by coordinated cyberattacks that disabled control systems, with attackers gaining remote access to internet-exposed PLCs, changing IP addresses and passwords, and blocking legitimate operators from accessing the systems. The incident raised concerns about reduced water pressure and flooding, demonstrating that a cyber intrusion can lead not only to data theft but also to physical operational disruption and safety hazards. The White House has launched Project Watershed 250, a public-private initiative that began with Texas water facilities in September to assess remote-access vulnerabilities across national infrastructure.

Control Directions Required by U.S. Regulation and NIST

U.S. OT security controls are moving beyond recommendations toward enforcement. The Global OT Cybersecurity Consortium (OTCC) has issued a binding directive requiring CISA to mandate asset visibility, network segmentation, and remote access controls. OTCC noted that self-assessment methods alone struggle to close gaps involving remotely connected devices and urged the expansion of IT security regulations to OT and industrial control system (ICS) environments.

Regulators have also released a security guide for remote access to water-sector OT. NIST SP 1800-45 identifies techniques that abuse remote payment channels or legitimate compromised accounts to manipulate PLCs and HMIs as the most severe threats. It therefore presented multifactor authentication (MFA) that does not rely on passwords alone, comprehensive network segmentation, logging of user activity, and session visibility as core requirements.

The common thread across these standards is that blocking connections alone is insufficient. Because an attacker’s account and remote access channel may appear legitimate, organizations must be able to determine who connected, when they connected, and what authority they used to issue commands. An asset inventory provides the starting point for control, while user-level identification and audit logs transform remote access control from a retrospective record into a manageable policy.

Legacy PLCs and the Availability Dilemma

Deploying these controls in the field presents challenges because the strongest IT security measures cannot simply be transferred unchanged. Legacy PLCs that have operated for decades may struggle to handle complex authentication algorithms or security protocols directly, while national infrastructure must operate around the clock. Even slight communication delays or false positives caused by a security solution can trigger a full process shutdown, creating a conflict between improving security and maintaining operational stability.

As a result, organizations are introducing control points at the front end without replacing existing PLCs. K-water is validating this approach with security company Sentstone through a performance-sharing agreement, deploying a security gateway in front of existing PLCs without modifying their firmware or control logic. Rather than strengthening the PLC’s own security features, this approach inspects incoming commands immediately before they reach the equipment.

OT Security Shifts Toward Pre-Execution Controls

Sentstone’s OTAC Trusted Access Gateway (TAG), used in the validation project, was deployed inline in front of the equipment. It dynamically verifies the identity and permissions of control commands from external remote users or internal operators immediately before they are forwarded to the PLC, using one-way dynamic code. The key is controlling unauthorized access through stolen accounts before it reaches the PLC, rather than merely raising alerts after a control command has been executed.

In this structure, user identification and authentication serve as the starting point for connection control, and authentication results determine whether commands are permitted. The validation also demonstrated that user-based audit logs and implementation of IEC 62443 standards can be adapted to field environments. A method that verifies remote users and command-level authority without compromising the availability of existing equipment is being discussed as a model applicable not only to water facilities but also to critical national infrastructure that must operate over the long term.

The change evident in the strengthening of U.S. regulation is more than an expansion of warning systems. Organizations must first determine what is connected, then identify who is accessing it, verify what permissions they hold, and record what they actually executed. This process cannot be completed through closed networks or post-event alerts alone. Building OT remote access control as one integrated system connecting policy, asset management, authentication, and audit logs remains the next security challenge.

For background and further details, see Boan News’ report on OT security at U.S. federal agencies.

Source Note

This article was prepared after reviewing the following source: Boan News — 32% of U.S. Federal Agencies Lack Even a Basic Asset Inventory… Global OT Security Hits Its Limits

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