Flax Typhoon Dissected: 8 Critical CVEs Behind the 7 Domains the FBI Seized and the Recon Network Built on the Mirai Botnet

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FBI disrupts Chinese hacking tools used to breach critical infrastructure

Key Takeaways

  • The FBI seized 7 domains operated by Integrity Technology (c0cc.cc, 98aicai.com, 98aicode.com, outlook3650.com, youtubecard.com, linkedinns.net, 98aiblog.com). 98aiblog.com was tied to a SoftEther VPN infrastructure installed inside compromised systems.
  • MicroScan is a Python-based vulnerability scanning platform carrying more than 1,300 penetration testing scripts. Combined with IoT devices, CCTV cameras, and other internet-connected equipment infected by the Mirai botnet, it enabled sweeping reconnaissance at scale.
  • FishHub is a post-compromise tool that delivers additional malware via spear phishing inside already-breached networks, grants remote access, and searches for and exfiltrates specific files. Its operation server also functioned as a stolen-data repository managed by Integrity Technology.

The China-state-linked threat group operates a multi-stage toolchain that combines the Mirai botnet, a 1,300-script vulnerability scanner, spear-phishing and remote-access malware, and a custom data-search web application. Blocking a single zero-day is insufficient to neutralize it; a layered defense that pairs continuous patching of known vulnerabilities, minimized external exposure, multi-factor authentication, and persistent IOC monitoring is essential.

Table of Contents

Nearly a year after the U.S. Department of Justice disrupted the Mirai botnet, which comprised more than 200,000 devices, in September 2024, the FBI followed up with a second operation that neutralized 7 core intrusion domains operated by Flax Typhoon. The significance of this action lies not in a single zero-day takedown but in the exposure of a multi-stage toolchain that a China-state-linked threat group had built through a private contractor. This article walks through the order in which MicroScan, FishHub, SoftEther VPN, EBurst, and the Mirai botnet were combined, and which 8 CVEs served as intrusion paths, step by step.

1. The FBI’s 7-Domain Seizure and the Role of Integrity Technology

The 7 domains seized by the FBI are c0cc.cc, 98aicai.com, 98aicode.com, outlook3650.com, youtubecard.com, linkedinns.net, and 98aiblog.com. Among them, 98aiblog.com was directly connected to a SoftEther VPN infrastructure installed inside compromised systems, while the remaining domains served as the frontend for the attacker’s intrusion tooling (MicroScan), subsequent malware delivery (FishHub), and a credential-harvesting web application. Domain registration records and operational servers were traced back to the China-based company Integrity Technology Group.

FBI Cyber Division Deputy Assistant Director Brett Leatherman stated that “the Chinese government relies on private contractors and companies to expand its cyber operations, and disrupting these organizations is critical to protecting U.S. networks.” In other words, the action targets not only the domains themselves but also Integrity Technology’s business structure and revenue model. While the U.S. joint cybersecurity advisory noted that some activity may be unrelated to Integrity Technology, the core toolchain was operated by the same vendor, making the response priority very high.

2. MicroScan: A Python-Based Scanner with 1,300 Exploitation Scripts

MicroScan is not a simple port scanner. It is a Python-based vulnerability scanning platform that bundles more than 1,300 penetration testing scripts. The attacker ran these scripts in parallel on IoT devices, CCTV cameras, routers, and other internet-connected equipment infected by the Mirai botnet to perform wide-ranging reconnaissance. What sets it apart from a typical vulnerability scanner is that its modules are segmented to operate within the constrained CPU and memory environment of IoT devices. Receiving only commands through the botnet’s C2 channel, each device executes distributed scans against pre-classified target sets.

In practice, MicroScan-style activity can be detected as anomalous, multi-source scanning traffic against externally exposed assets. In an IDS such as Suricata, registering a detection rule for HTTP payload patterns arriving from different ASNs over the same path within a short window is effective. The following is an example Suricata rule.

# Suricata - Detect pattern of 50+ ASNs scanning the same path within 60 seconds
alert http any any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:"FLAX-SCAN distributed scan"; \
  flow:to_server,established; http.uri; content:"/"; http.method; content:"GET"; \
  threshold:type both, track by_src, count 50, seconds 60; sid:2025100101; rev:1;)

3. FishHub: Post-Intrusion Spear Phishing, Remote Access, and Data Theft

If MicroScan handles external reconnaissance, FishHub operates inside an already-compromised network. FishHub is a modular framework that integrates three functions: (1) spear-phishing email delivery targeting internal users, (2) granting remote access, and (3) searching and exfiltrating files based on specific extensions and keywords. Its operational server also includes a stolen-data repository managed by Integrity Technology, enabling end-to-end processing from intrusion through lateral movement to data exfiltration within a single tool.

The FBI recovered data from more than 20 organizations on FishHub servers, including 6 universities in Taiwan. This is not a simple targeted attack; the fact that universities and research institutions were used as the primary path for intellectual property theft represents a direct threat signal to domestic academia. SoftEther VPN creates a tunnel that allows the attacker persistent access to the internal network, bypassing any monitoring of outbound traffic that the organization’s firewall might perform.

4. A Global Recon Network Combined with the Mirai Botnet

Flax Typhoon’s most distinctive feature is the repurposing of the Mirai botnet as reconnaissance infrastructure. Traditional DDoS botnets have been used only for traffic flooding, but in this operation the FBI confirmed that infected botnet devices were reassigned as C2 workers executing MicroScan scripts. FBI joint advisory analysis indicated that a significant share of the 200,000 nodes disrupted in September 2024 survived into 2025 and were repurposed for reconnaissance.

To check for Mirai botnet infection in IoT and CCTV environments, the following commands should be run on NVRs, IP cameras, and routers to verify the use of default credentials and any abnormal outbound connections.

# Hikvision/Pelco CCTV - Check Telnet banner and active outbound connections
for ip in $(seq 1 254); do
  timeout 2 bash -c "echo > /dev/tcp/192.168.1.$ip/23" 2>/dev/null && \
    echo "[$ip] Telnet OPEN - inspection required"
done

# Infection indicator: exposure of default credential (admin/12345) Telnet banner
nmap -p 23,2323,48101 --script telnet-brute 192.168.1.0/24 -oA iot_scan_$(date +%F)

5. The 8 Exploited CVEs and the Software Families They Targeted

Flax Typhoon primarily used “old CVEs” whose exploit code had been public for years. The reason is twofold: (1) many legacy systems with low patch rates still exist, and (2) public exploits are stable, so even when detection patterns are known they get buried in noise. The table below lists the 8 CVEs confirmed in this operation.

CVE Target Software Vulnerability Type Exploitation Stage
CVE-2015-3306 ProFTPD File read Initial intrusion
CVE-2015-5477 ISC BIND DoS (recon disruption) Reconnaissance
CVE-2016-3081 Apache Struts RCE Initial intrusion
CVE-2021-3199 ONLYOFFICE File write Web shell installation
CVE-2023-22894 Strapi Information disclosure Reconnaissance
CVE-2014-6278 Bash (Shellshock) RCE Initial intrusion
CVE-2019-11510 Pulse Secure VPN File read Credential theft
CVE-2021-22205 GitLab RCE Initial intrusion

Patch priority is highest for items that lead directly to RCE or credential theft, such as Apache Struts, Pulse Secure VPN, and GitLab. For the remaining CVEs, patch application status must be queried immediately in the asset management system based on the table.

6. Password Spraying (EBurst) and AD Credential Collection

In the post-intrusion phase, the open-source tool EBurst was used. EBurst is a password-spraying automation tool targeting Microsoft Exchange servers, distributing authentication attempts against multiple accounts from a single IP to bypass account-lockout policies and detection thresholds. After obtaining email accounts through EBurst, the attacker collected Active Directory credentials and prepared a Golden Ticket attack on the domain controller using privileged accounts.

The FBI also discovered a custom web application that allowed searching and reading of stolen emails without direct account access. The tool operates as a proxy in front of the mail server, designed to let the attacker query mailbox contents by keyword using only stolen session tokens. The following is a KQL query example for detecting password spraying in M365 logs.

// Microsoft Sentinel KQL - 30+ account authentication failures from same IP within 60 minutes
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(24h)
| where ResultType in ("50126", "50053", "50057")  // Invalid password / lockout / denied
| summarize FailedAccounts = dcount(UserId) by IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where FailedAccounts >= 30
| join kind=leftouter (SigninLogs | where ResultType == 0) on IPAddress
| project IPAddress, FailedAccounts, SuccessfulSignin = count_
| order by FailedAccounts desc

7. Target Analysis: Global Critical Infrastructure and Academia

Targets confirmed in this operation span a wide range beyond South Carolina’s power utility, airports in Japan and Poland, natural gas and electric utilities in Taiwan, and U.S. government agencies, extending to manufacturing, healthcare, IT, law enforcement, education, and religious organizations. The inclusion of numerous organizations across Southeast Asia, Africa, and North America shows that Flax Typhoon pursues a “wide reconnaissance plus deep intrusion” strategy targeting not a specific industry but any organization with broad external exposure. As seen in the recent CVE-2026-21589 case affecting Atlassian data center products, there is a high likelihood that this recon network will be put to immediate use as soon as new vulnerabilities are disclosed.

The direct implication for domestic organizations is that not only critical infrastructure such as power, gas, and airports, but also universities, research institutes, and mid-sized IT companies can serve as primary intrusion targets. The fact that 6 Taiwanese universities were included among the data-recovery organizations in the FBI’s release demonstrates that the risk of domestic academia being targeted through intellectual property and research data has become real. When combined with patterns in which a single mail-server node becomes the starting point for a full compromise, as in the Zimbra vulnerability case, the attack surface expands further.

8. IOCs and Immediate Inspection Steps from the FBI-CISA-NSA Joint Advisory

The joint advisory recommended patching the 8 CVEs, blocking exposed services, and applying multi-factor authentication, along with IOCs (IPs, domains, malware hashes). In practice, the IOCs published in the advisory must be immediately reflected in SIEM, EDR, next-generation firewall, and DNS sinkhole rules, and an automated pipeline that refreshes them on a 24-hour cycle is needed. As revealed in a recent cybersecurity gap assessment, incidents are increasing but zero-trust budgets are stagnant in many organizations, so “attack-surface reduction” on existing assets is more cost-effective than new investment.

Priority investigation items at the suspected-compromise stage are as follows. (1) Active Directory credential requests from external IPs, (2) abnormal mailbox access (reading of unauthorized mailboxes, Inbox Rule tampering), (3) Golden Ticket indicators on the domain controller (anomalous last-change timestamp of the KRBTGT hash), and (4) traces of attacker tools such as SoftEther and EBurst. EDR rules that periodically detect unauthorized SoftEther VPN installations through registry and service logs should be a baseline for every operational organization.

What to Do Right Now

  • Query the asset management system immediately for patch coverage of the 8 CVEs (ProFTPD, BIND, Apache Struts, ONLYOFFICE, Strapi, Bash, Pulse Secure VPN, GitLab), and patch or network-isolate unpatched systems within 72 hours.
  • Add the 7 FBI-advisory IOC domains (c0cc.cc, 98aicai.com, 98aicode.com, outlook3650.com, youtubecard.com, linkedinns.net, 98aiblog.com) as block rules to the DNS sinkhole and NGFW, and configure a 24-hour automated refresh.
  • Register an EDR rule for unauthorized SoftEther VPN installation, and audit registry, service, and scheduled-task logs once per day.
  • Inspect IoT, CCTV, and network equipment for Telnet and default-credential exposure, and complete firmware updates and default-password changes within one week.
  • Register a KQL-based password-spraying detection query in the M365 audit log, and configure a daily alert to the operations team.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q. How low should the password-spraying detection threshold be set?

It depends on the number of accounts in the organization, but a practical starting point that reduces detection noise is to set 30+ failed authentications within a 60-minute window as the first threshold, and to prioritize alerts for cases where 10+ failures and 1+ success occur simultaneously. Organizations with fewer than 1,000 accounts should lower the threshold to 15.

Q. If legacy systems prevent patching all 8 CVEs, how should priorities be set?

Prioritize patching CVE-2016-3081 (Struts), CVE-2021-22205 (GitLab), and CVE-2019-11510 (Pulse Secure VPN), which lead directly to RCE or credential theft, and isolate the rest behind a WAF or zero-trust access control based on internet exposure to block exploitability. For systems where patching is not possible, consider decommissioning or applying a virtual patch.

Q. How are IOCs continuously incorporated in distributed asset environments such as universities and research institutes?

Configure a TAXII client in the SIEM to automatically collect IOC feeds, and build a pipeline that refreshes IOCs every 6 hours and auto-distributes them to DNS sinkhole, NGFW, and EDR rules. Manual refreshes on a weekly basis are acceptable, but the gap between new IOC publication and incident occurrence must be minimized.

Source Reference

This article was written with reference to the following source: Bleeping Computer — FBI disrupts Chinese hacking tools used to breach critical infrastructure

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