Key Summary
- Hacking incident statistics: Breach incidents up 26% and leak incidents up 45% compared to 2023, yet the share of information security budgets is on a downward trend
- Zero Trust budget cuts: Budgets related to Zero Trust, the next-generation security paradigm, have been reduced by more than 27%, from KRW 6.2 billion to KRW 4.5 billion
- AI safety budget gap: The safety field budget is only KRW 27.4 billion compared to the AI performance infrastructure budget, creating a 224-to-1 ratio that breaks the balance of investment against AI threats
Analysis indicates that Korean cybersecurity is revealing structural gaps across all three axes — budget allocation, control tower, and private-sector accountability — at a pace slower than the advancement of AI threats, and that the chain of hacking incidents is highly likely to spread across industries if the Zero Trust transition and the 224-to-1 imbalance in AI safety budgets are not addressed simultaneously
Table of Contents
- Key Summary
- The Duality the Numbers Tell: Incidents Rise, but Information Security Budgets Fall
- Budget Gap 1: Zero Trust Adoption Stalls, and AI Safety Is Overlooked
- Private-Sector Accountability Gap: Tving 39.54 Million Accounts, Toss Payments Receipts, Gangnam Unni 220,000 Medical Records
- Threat Realism Cross-Verification: BPFDoor Disguised as SpamSniper Targeted 6,000 Korean Organizations
- Government Response Package: KRW 523.2 Billion Increase, KRW 4.7 Trillion Frontier AI, December Master Plan

The moment Rep. Choi Hyung-du said “South Korea is under attack” during the National Assembly’s Science, ICT, Broadcasting and Communications Committee state audit on the 6th, that single sentence compressed the structural gap in Korean cybersecurity. Breach incidents rose 26% and leak incidents rose 45% compared to 2023, yet the share of information security in the total budget of the Ministry of Science and ICT actually decreased. The 2026 cybersecurity gap is not merely a budget shortfall — it is the result of three axes collapsing simultaneously: budget allocation, governance, and private-sector accountability.
The Duality the Numbers Tell: Incidents Rise, but Information Security Budgets Fall
The hacking statistics are clear. Breach incidents up 26% and leak incidents up 45% compared to 2023. Yet the share of information security within the total budget of the Ministry of Science and ICT is on a downward trend. The gap between attack frequency and defense investment widens every year, and if this disparity is not closed, a chain of hacking incidents will inevitably spread across industries.
A more serious indicator is the asymmetry of budget allocation. Budgets related to Zero Trust, which is touted as the next-generation security paradigm, have been cut by more than 27% from KRW 6.2 billion to KRW 4.5 billion. At the same time, trillions of won are being poured into AI performance infrastructure, while the AI safety field budget stands at only KRW 27.4 billion, creating a 224-to-1 ratio. Investment aimed at building safe AI is lagging far behind the speed at which AI becomes an attacker’s weapon.
Budget Gap 1: Zero Trust Adoption Stalls, and AI Safety Is Overlooked
Zero Trust is an architecture that does not trust internal networks and verifies every access request. It is an alternative that reflects the reality in which perimeter security centered on legacy VPNs and firewalls has been rendered ineffective by attackers who steal legitimate user credentials. The reduction of the budget from KRW 6.2 billion to KRW 4.5 billion is read as a signal of effectively abandoning this transition.
If Zero Trust is being introduced in stages in the field, the first thing to address is the path entering internal SaaS from outside. Place an open-source Identity-Aware Proxy such as Cloudflare Zero Trust’s WARP client, Pomerium, or Teleport in front of file servers and admin consoles, and tie it to OIDC authentication from Okta/Keycloak with short-TTL (e.g., 15-minute) tokens. Based on Pomerium’s config.yaml, a good starting point is to specify whitelist entries such as sub_rules: [“email.ends_with(‘@company_domain’)”] and ttl: “15m” under the policy item. Rather than tearing down firewalls all at once, prioritizing replacement of only the “admin console → IAP” segment to measure the effect makes it easier to convince governance stakeholders.
The 224-to-1 gap, meaning an AI safety budget of KRW 27.4 billion, is not a simple comparison. Considering that the blast radius of damage a single AI model can produce is on a different scale from human error, this ratio effectively says, “Resolve damages caused by AI at your own expense.” The Ministry of Science and ICT has announced that it will unveil a master plan for building a national AI safety ecosystem in December.
The reason for the December announcement timing is simple. Incidents have already occurred, yet no standards exist yet. The core elements the master plan must produce are three: a model risk assessment standard, a red team operations guide, and an incident response SLA.
Private-Sector Accountability Gap: Tving 39.54 Million Accounts, Toss Payments Receipts, Gangnam Unni 220,000 Medical Records
The scale of private-sector incidents put under the audit spotlight tells the story. Tving left 24GB of data exposed through a virtual server in an incident involving 39.54 million accounts and source code leaks, and the disclosure was also delayed. Toss Payments suffered a mass leak of payment receipts, Gangnam Unni had sensitive medical data of 220,000 individuals compromised and management directly admitted fault before the National Assembly. During the same period, Korea Electric Power Corporation’s 24,000-person information leak, the Government24 breach, and the alleged LG U+ hacking cover-up piled on top of one another.
Looking at the recurring pattern of sensitive data leaks, it becomes clear that the end of accountability does not stop at the CSIRT or the security team. The fact that 24GB of customer data was left unattended on a single virtual server is the absence of data governance. Where data has been replicated, who accesses it, and when unused copies are destroyed — very few organizations have answers to these questions. In practical terms, the answer is close to introducing a data catalog (DataHub, Amundsen), automatic masking upon copy creation, and forcing expiration of unused copies via lifecycle policy on S3/GCS buckets. Only when management is bound by “automated controls” rather than “internal policy” can intentional cover-ups be distinguished from simple negligence.
Threat Realism Cross-Verification: BPFDoor Disguised as SpamSniper Targeted 6,000 Korean Organizations
There is a case that shows how the budget and accountability gaps intersect with real-world threats. According to a Rapid7 intelligence report, a sophisticated backdoor called BPFDoor has been disguising itself as a legitimate process to target Korean and Taiwanese environments. Notably, evidence was found of it evading detection by impersonating the SpamSniper process of Jiran Security, a familiar name in the security industry. Disguising as a legitimate process means that signature-based detection is effectively neutralized. According to Boannews’s BPFDoor analysis, intrusion attempts were observed in environments of more than 6,000 Korean organizations, making it necessary to check memory-based detection capabilities before the December master plan announcement.
To respond to such legitimate-process-disguising backdoors, static indicators such as file hashes are insufficient. One must follow behaviors in memory — abnormal port bindings, parent-child process relationships, inconsistencies in execution context. At the EDR layer, CrowdStrike Falcon, SentinelOne, or in the open-source realm, the combination of Velociraptor + osquery is commonly used. In Velociraptor, an artifact is defined as follows to query both the listening ports in memory and the process tree together.
name: Generic.Detection.AnomalousListen
description: Detection of abnormal port-binding process behavior
type: CLIENT
sources:
- queries:
- |
LET listenports <= SELECT Pid, Name, Address, Port
FROM netstat()
WHERE State = "LISTEN"
- |
SELECT Pid, Name, CommandLine, ParentName
FROM pslist()
WHERE Pid IN listenports.Pid
AND Port NOT IN [80, 443, 22, 3389]
With this, when a process with a legitimate name opens an abnormal port, it is immediately classified as an anomaly. Threats such as BPFDoor ultimately come down to the ability to find “abnormalities that look normal,” and this capability is the control with the best cost-effectiveness compared to signatures. In the author’s experience inspecting multiple companies through incident response, organizations running only signature-based EDR are nearly defenseless against BPFDoor and legitimate-process-disguising backdoors. At least one tool that examines behavioral correlations in memory must be in place for realistic detection.
Government Response Package: KRW 523.2 Billion Increase, KRW 4.7 Trillion Frontier AI, December Master Plan
The government has pledged to increase the 2026 related budget from the existing KRW 363.4 billion to KRW 523.2 billion. In addition, a KRW 4.7 trillion-scale Frontier AI project for cyber security response is being additionally pursued. The numbers alone look like a large increase, but when the KRW 4.7 trillion being poured into AI performance infrastructure and the KRW 27.4 billion AI safety budget are placed in the same frame, the priority still tilts toward “capability.” The figure and context of the statements can be confirmed in the primary source article from the state audit.
The key concept of the Frontier AI project is to mandate safety research simultaneously with the development of high-performance AI models. Based on what the author has experienced in the field, when safety research is conducted as something to be “bolted on later,” evaluation comes in after model specifications are nearly frozen, costs explode, and changes become impossible. To avoid the government budget allocation falling into the same trap, it is necessary to embed a mandatory item (e.g., 10% or more) that specifies the safety research ratio within the Frontier AI budget. If the red team standards, incident notification SLA, and incident-related liquidated damages/compensation governance to be included in the master plan are not nailed down simultaneously, the KRW 523.2 billion will become another form of budget gap.
Unresolved Issues: Absence of a Control Tower, the LG U+ Cover-Up Allegations, the Five Major Bank CEOs as Witnesses
The state audit being over does not mean the matter is closed. First, a single control tower that integrates and coordinates cybersecurity functions scattered across ministries is still absent. Hacking does not know ministry boundaries, yet the response organization remains trapped within administrative branch boundaries. Second, the LG U+ hacking cover-up allegations put telecom carriers’ ability to voluntarily disclose security incidents to the test. Third, the People Power Party has applied for the heads of five major commercial banks — KB, Shinhan, Hana, Woori, and NongHyup — as witnesses at the Financial Supervisory Service state audit by the Steering Committee on the 19th. It remains to be seen whether the aftershocks of the Tving, Toss Payments, and Gangnam Unni incidents will spread to the financial sector.
Looking at overseas cases, cyber incidents typically start in one industry and spread to another. The 2017 Equifax credit information leak led to a redesign of KYC procedures across U.S. finance, and the 2020 SolarWinds Orion hack drove SBOM adoption across the entire U.S. government supply chain are prime examples. If Korea’s chain of hacking incidents does not lead to substantive changes such as industry-wide SBOM adoption, incident notification standards, and administrator credential rotation, it is highly likely that a similar state audit will be held again in a year.
Summary of Issues
- The 2026 budget increase to KRW 523.2 billion and the KRW 4.7 trillion Frontier AI project are being pursued simultaneously, but the AI safety budget remains at only KRW 27.4 billion, leaving the 224-to-1 gap unaddressed.
- The 27% cut in the Zero Trust budget from KRW 6.2 billion to KRW 4.5 billion is a decision that delays the transition to the next-generation security paradigm itself.
- The absence of a pan-government cybersecurity control tower, the LG U+ cover-up allegations, and the appearance of the five major commercial bank CEOs as witnesses will come into focus at the Financial Supervisory Service state audit on the 19th.
- Legitimate-process-disguising backdoors such as BPFDoor render signature-based detection ineffective, making memory- and behavior-based EDR adoption effectively mandatory.
Frequently Asked Questions
Do I have to tear down all legacy firewalls to adopt Zero Trust?
No. It is more realistic in terms of both cost and organizational buy-in to first replace only the admin traffic path coming from outside with an IAP (Cloudflare Access, Pomerium, etc.), observe traffic logs and access patterns for at least three months, and then expand in stages. Legacy firewalls can remain for internal segment control.
Can legitimate-process-disguising backdoors like BPFDoor be blocked with signatures?
Blocking itself is difficult. Instead, the standard approach in EDR is to periodically query abnormal port bindings in memory, parent-child process relationships, and the list of loaded BPF programs (osquery’s process_open_sockets and bpf_programs tables) to classify them as anomalies. The key is behavior patterns, not signatures.
Which controls should I start with to prevent sensitive data leaks?
An effective sequence is: first, make copy locations visible through a data catalog; second, force expiration of unused copies via lifecycle policy on S3 and GCS buckets; and third, make the data itself useless even if leaked through KMS- and Vault-based tokenization. Automated controls must be deployed before policy documents to reduce negligence.
The 2026 cybersecurity gap cannot be narrowed to a single cause. The budget is short, there is no control tower, and private-sector accountability is weak — because all three axes are shaking simultaneously, the scenario in which a chain of hacking incidents spreads across industries is becoming a reality. Whether the December master plan nails down these three axes at the same time will be the turning point for the coming year.
This article pairs well with Two Citrix NetScaler RCE Zero-Days, Real-World Exploitation Confirmed — Five Immediate Response Points and Five Risks of the PEEP Backdoor — How Attacks Disguised as Browser Extensions Work, connecting the context of backdoor and zero-day response.
Source Reference
This article was written with reference to the following original: Boannews — “South Korea Is Under Attack”… The Cybersecurity Gap That Heated Up the State Audit

Leave a Reply