Tag: 사용자 행동 변화

  • 7-Step Practical Procedure for Repeat Phishing Simulation Failures — From Training to Systems

    7-Step Practical Procedure for Repeat Phishing Simulation Failures — From Training to Systems

    Key Summary

    • The original author observes that certain users within the organization repeatedly record near-50% failure rates in phishing simulations, and has concluded that additional training alone does not drive behavioral change
    • The original post reveals a perception that indifference plays a larger role than lack of learning ability
    • The most frequently proposed solution in community responses is escalation to higher decision-making lines such as HR and executive leadership, an area that is difficult to address by the security team alone

    Analysis

    Table of Contents

    If you have ever reviewed phishing simulation results and seen the same name light up in red every quarter, you know the moment. One employee repeats a near-50% failure rate, and two or three others in the same department follow the same pattern. You send additional training, run another simulation, and the next quarter that name shows up again. This is the point where the security team can no longer solve the problem alone.

    Why the Same Person Keeps Clicking

    Phishing simulation failures fall into two categories. One is a lack of learning ability, and the other is sufficient ability without behavioral change. The cases you encounter repeatedly in practice are mostly the latter. Users know what phishing is, but work priorities, alert fatigue, and habitual clicking prevent behavior from changing.

    There are clear structural reasons why training fails to deliver results. A 15-minute training session once per quarter is too low in intensity, immediate feedback after a failure is lacking, and above all, the issue tends to be framed as individual awareness improvement rather than organizational responsibility. The solutions frequently mentioned among practitioners sharing the same concern converge on one point: do not try to solve this with training alone — raise policy, training, and technical controls simultaneously.

    Redefining Phishing Simulation Failure Criteria

    The first thing to define is what “failure” means. “Opening an email” and “entering credentials” carry different risk levels. The former can happen out of simple curiosity or an automatic preview pane, while the latter is clearly a risky behavior. Bundling these two together as a single failure distorts actual exposure by department and seniority.

    Next, failure data must be accumulated and tracked by department, seniority, and time period. Distinguishing whether the same person fails repeatedly every quarter, whether failures concentrate in a specific department, or whether they spike temporarily around year-end or the start of the year will naturally clarify your response priorities.

    7-Step Practical Procedure for Repeat Failures

    Step 1. Redefine Failure Criteria into Four Levels

    Divide actions into four stages — “email opened → link clicked → credentials entered → attachment executed” — and document the risk level of each stage in the policy document. Credential entry and attachment execution should be tracked separately as high-risk behavior.

    Step 2. Accumulate and Objectify Data

    Separate quarterly failure rates, lists of repeat failures, departmental concentration, and high-risk behavior ratios into a dedicated dashboard. Whether a near-50% failure rate repeats for one individual or is spread across the organization determines the next step.

    Step 3. Escalate to the HR and Executive Line

    Individual-level sanctions cannot be decided by the security team alone. Submit quantitative data showing that repeat failures could lead to actual incidents, and secure alignment on policy changes and delegation of authority. This is the point where the author gets stuck longest in practice, because the act of restricting a user account itself touches HR and legal review territory.

    Step 4. Tiered Mandatory Training

    The pattern frequently discussed in the community is escalating intensity. One hour of mandatory training after the first failure, a full-day program after the second cumulative failure, and a one-week intensive course after the third. The key is that this is not an “additional notice” but a “mandatory schedule that cannot be avoided.” Hand over the authority for completion verification directly to HR.

    Step 5. Automatic Lockout and Supervisor-Based Unlock

    After three cumulative failures, automatically block external email access for the affected account. Design the unlock so that it is only possible with approval from a supervisor or the head of the security team. This policy is the most direct way to make users feel the “cost of clicking.” At the same time, separating approval authority so that the security team cannot arbitrarily unlock accounts increases policy credibility.

    Step 6. Reinforce Technical Controls

    Controls that rely solely on user behavior will eventually break down. At the mail security gateway, force new domain URLs through an automatic quarantine page, block macro attachments by default, and allow external cloud shared links to be opened immediately only for whitelisted domains. A safety net that makes the user’s click itself less dangerous is essential.

    Step 7. Policy Documentation and Periodic Reassessment

    If “who does what” is not left as a one-page policy, every procedure becomes blurred the moment the responsible person changes six months later. Formalize the responsible party, approval line, unlock procedure, and reassessment cycle (e.g., once per quarter), and obtain executive approval before publicizing it.

    Common Mistakes in Practice

    The most common mistake in operating phishing simulations is simply increasing the number of training sessions. User behavior is the result of system design, not training hours. Another mistake is setting failure criteria too broadly, burying high-risk behavior. Counting “email opened” as a failure makes the data richer but fails to surface actual incident risk.

    If you strengthen policy without technical controls, users will find another path to meet their deadlines. Policy, training, and technical controls must move together to be effective.

    Combining Policy, Training, and Technical Controls on One Page

    Phishing simulation is not a project for the security team alone. Users, HR, executives, and IT infrastructure must all look in the same direction to reduce repeat failures, and that is what ultimately raises the organization’s overall phishing resilience. Starting from the smallest thing you can review today is a realistic starting point. Real-world discussions among practitioners on this topic can be found in the field discussion on users who repeatedly fail phishing simulations.

    What to Do Right Now

    • Within this week, redefine phishing simulation failure criteria into four levels (opened, clicked, credentials entered, attachment executed)
    • Share the quarterly list of repeat failures with HR and request a single quantitative data meeting
    • Review the new domain URL quarantine policy at the mail gateway as the top priority
    • Submit a draft policy for automatic lockout after three cumulative failures and supervisor-based unlock as an executive agenda item
    • Summarize the policy document into a one-page PDF, announce it internally, and register a quarterly reassessment schedule on the calendar

    Practical Application Points

    • Separate failure criteria into four levels and track only high-risk behavior (credential entry, attachment execution) separately
    • Escalate repeat failures to the HR line with quantitative data to break out of the single-decision-maker structure
    • Design automatic lockout after three cumulative failures with supervisor-based unlock to eliminate arbitrariness
    • Lay a safety net with mail gateway, link quarantine, and attachment blocking to reduce click risk itself
    • Summarize the policy document on one page and run a quarterly reassessment cycle

    Frequently Asked Questions

    How should phishing simulation failure criteria be defined?

    In phishing simulations, it is effective in practice to divide user actions into four stages — email opened, link clicked, credentials entered, and attachment executed — and aggregate only the latter two as a separate high-risk group for tracking. Bundling them as a single failure distorts actual exposure by department and clouds priority decisions.

    Doesn’t the automatic lockout policy cause significant user backlash?

    When applied only after three cumulative failures, with unlock authority separated to a supervisor or the head of the security team, users perceive it not as an “arbitrary block” but as an “approval-based procedure.” Announcing it in a policy document in advance and securing HR approval significantly increases acceptance.

    Does tiered mandatory training really work?

    Mandatory scheduling is a bigger variable than training hours. Escalating intensity to one hour for the first failure, one day for the second, and one week for the third, with HR directly verifying completion, is effective. It is the fact that the training “cannot be avoided” that changes user behavior, not the content itself.

    If technical controls are strengthened, is training unnecessary?

    No. Even if technical controls reduce click risk, leakages recur when bypass routes emerge (personal email, external messengers, mobile mail apps). Policy, training, and technical controls must move together for the effect to be sustained.

    Reference Source

    This article was written after reviewing the following original source: r/cybersecurity — Users repeatedly failing phishing campaigns