bunny.net isolated a CDN node in Armenia and began sequentially reissuing TLS certificates to address potential exposure following unauthorized access to third-party server-management software at an infrastructure provider. The company halted traffic routing to the affected server within 20 minutes of receiving the warning, then proceeded to delete server data and revoke access permissions. Investigations by both parties found no evidence of unauthorized access to bunny.net servers or data, but the circumstances make it difficult to conclude definitively that no incident occurred.
Attack Surface Exposed at the Supply Chain Boundary
Only one of bunny.net’s infrastructure providers reported the unauthorized access. According to the initial notice, a warning concerning access to third-party server-management software was received the week before. The affected server hosted one CDN node in Armenia. After receiving the warning, bunny.net’s engineering team halted traffic routing within 20 minutes, safely deleted the server data, and revoked access permissions to other systems.
The impact of the CDN security incident depends on the assets stored on the server. If the node was accessed, temporarily cached CDN content, Pull Zone configurations, and TLS certificates stored on the server may have been exposed. Other customers’ data and bunny.net account data were not stored on the affected server, and internal systems were not impacted. bunny.net continues to monitor its infrastructure closely alongside the provider and pursue the investigation.
Certificate Replacement and Different Customer Responses
As a preventative measure, bunny.net revoked and reissued all TLS certificates for the platform domains b-cdn.net and bunny.run. Managed certificates for custom domains are also being replaced, with the process proceeding gradually in controlled batches to prevent interruptions to content delivery. New certificates use new private keys, while existing certificates will continue to be served without interruption until they are replaced.
The work was initially expected to be completed within 24 hours, but a later update indicated that it would take longer than anticipated and finish by the end of October 31. Customers using managed certificates do not need to take any additional action. Conversely, customers who directly manage their TLS certificates are advised to revoke their existing certificates as a preventative measure and reissue them with new private keys.
Supply Chain Security in Response to Access Risks
The key aspect of this response went beyond disconnecting a single CDN node to also recovering adjacent assets, including certificates and permissions. The absence of evidence in the investigation does not amount to a definitive denial of a breach. It highlights the risk that when management software is compromised in a supply chain, stored configurations and cryptographic credentials can simultaneously become part of the attack surface.
An additional update will be posted on the status page when certificate reissuance is complete, and customers will also be notified by email if any new facts affecting them are confirmed. Operators reviewing the bunny.net security incident should first examine their own TLS certificate management practices and, if they directly manage certificates, replace them with new certificates that do not reuse old keys. The full sequence of events is covered in the Bunny CDN security incident report.
Source
This article was prepared after reviewing the following source: geeknews — Bunny CDN security incident









